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ABSTRACT 
 
During the mid-2000s the number of temporary foreign workers (TFWs) 
present in Canada increased dramatically, more than tripling in eight years. The 
bulk of the increase was due to an expansion of the Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program (TFWP) to include lower-skilled occupations. The stated reason for the 
expansion was to address short-term labour shortages. Contrary to expectations, 
upon the onset of the economic downturn in 2008, the number of TFWs did not 
decrease significantly, and appears to be increasing again in 2010 and 2011. This 
paper tracks the evolution of the TFWP from a stable program designed to 
address short-term labour needs in high-skilled occupations into a broader 
labour market tool. The paper examines the most recent available statistical data 
for the TFWP and other documentary evidence to argue the role of the TFWP in 
Canada’s labour market has quietly shifted, becoming a permanent, large-scale 
labour pool for many industries, reminiscent of European migrant worker 
programs. The paper also examines the potential labour market implications of 
an expanded, entrenched TFWP. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a huge issue. The fact is no matter how hard employers try they can't find Canadians 
to do many of these jobs and we have no option but to look outside our borders.   
Minister of Human Resources and Social Development Monte 
Solberg, quoted in The Edmonton Journal on February 24, 2007 
 
t the height of the economic boom in Western Canada, Minister 
Solberg and other federal and provincial politicians impressed upon 
Canadians the magnitude of Canada’s labour shortage and the need 
to turn to temporary foreign workers (TFWs) in increasing numbers to address 
pressing labour needs. Their solution was to rapidly expand the size and scope of 
the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP). In less than five years, the 
number of permits issued under the TFWP more than doubled. At the time, the 
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TFWP was trumpeted as a flexible solution to a short-term labour shortage 
problem and that it was sensitive to employer demand for workers. Implied 
within the discussion of increased use of temporary foreign workers was the 
promise that when labour shortages ebbed, the program’s inherent elasticity 
would allow for a subsequent reduction in foreign workers. That claim was put 
to the test with the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. 
This article examines the evolution of the TFWP, including its continued 
growth and entrenchment since the economic downturn. Specifically, it will 
focus on aspects of the program not related to the agricultural worker and live-in 
caregiver streams, which have been the attention of focus elsewhere. The pattern 
suggests that employers in certain industries have become increasingly reliant 
upon the TFWP to address labour market needs. This shift continues the long 
pattern in Canada’s immigration policy, quietly shifting away from permanent 
settlement towards the use of foreign workers with limited citizenship rights 
(Fudge 2011). The new design of the TFWP is constructing a permanent class of 
vulnerable workers. The increased reliance by certain segments of industry 
parallels the evolution of migrant worker programs after the Second World War, 
such as the Gastarbeiterprogramm in Germany and in other Western European 
nations (Castles 2006). 
 
MIGRANT WORKER PROGRAMS INTERNATIONALLY  
 
The flow of workers from region to region in search of employment 
opportunity is as old as labour markets themselves. Programs that restrict the 
citizenship rights of migrant workers are also longstanding, but a new form of 
formalized “guest” worker program is of more recent origin, with some of the 
first implemented in the United States, Switzerland and Germany in the 1940s 
and 1950s (Ruhs 2002). In most cases, guest worker programs were established to 
mitigate short-term labour shortages or to regulate the flow of migrant workers 
into a region, although a secondary goal might be to stem illegal immigration 
(Martin 2003). The purpose of such programs was to expand labour supply 
without burdening the state with obligations of citizenship (Sharma 2007) and to 
maximize labour market flexibility for employers (Martin 2010).  
Research into guest worker programs show they have a tendency to last 
longer and grow larger than intended, developing structural labour market 
dependencies among employers and creating pockets of foreign worker-
dominated occupations that are disconnected from local workers and labour 
markets (Ruhs 2002). The programs build employers’ economic and political 
reliance on the continuation and expansion of guest workers, as they begin to 
“make investment decisions that assume migrants will continue to be available” 
(Martin 2010: 127). In turn, this leads employers to pressure against program 
restrictions. The effects on labour markets can be long term and profound (Pastor 
and Alva 2004). 
The pockets of TFW-dominated occupations “[...] tend to be concentrated at 
the extremes of the job ladder, with more or less education than the average 
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worker in the destination country” (Martin, Abella and Kuptsch 2006: 54). The 
concentration at the top end is due to the relative scarcity of very highly-skilled 
and specialized occupations, which naturally construct an international labour 
pool. The bottom end is comprised of low-skilled workers in low-paying, high 
insecurity jobs undesirable to permanent residents. 
Correlated with migrant worker program expansion is growth in the 
exploitation and violation of migrant workers’ rights (Ruhs and Martin 2008) as 
well as inadequate legal enforcement (Ruhs 2002; Abella 2006). This is 
particularly true among programs classified as “laissez faire” programs, 
described by Ruhs and Martin (2008) as employer-driven programs with no 
quotas or restrictions by occupation or industry. Canada’s TFWP, as will be 
explained below, fits into this categorization. 
Ruhs and Martin also argue that guest worker programs induce a trade-off 
between rights and numbers. “[C]ountries with large numbers or shares of low-
skilled migrant workers offer them relatively few rights, while smaller numbers 
of migrants are typically associated with more rights. The primary reason for this 
trade-off is that rights can create costs for employers, and rising labor costs are 
typically associated with a reduced demand for labour” (Ruhs and Martin 2008: 
260). Through most of its history, Canada’s TFWP program focused mostly on 
smaller numbers of higher-skilled workers. Changes over the past decade have 
shifted that balance. 
 
HISTORY OF CANADA’S TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM 
 
The TFWP evolved out of Canada’s first formalized migrant worker 
program, the 1973 Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program 
(NIEAP), which established a new class of temporary resident tied specifically to 
non-permanent employment. The NIEAP constructed a series of restrictions on 
the rights of these residents that continue to form core characteristics of the 
TFWP today (Trumper and Wong 2010). These include work permits tied 
directly to employment status, restriction of labour mobility rights by requiring 
formal permission to change employers or working conditions, and prohibition 
on applying for work permits or changing immigration status from within the 
country. The latter restrictions effectively prevented workers under the NIEAP 
from applying for permanent residency. Sharma has argued that the NIEAP 
effectively “legalized the re-subordination of many nonwhites entering the 
country by re-categorizing them as temporary and permanently foreign 
workers” without many of the rights of residents (2007: 175).  
In the ensuing decades, Canada’s migrant worker programs diverged into 
multiple streams to address the needs of specific industries and occupations. 
Each stream varies in its permit restrictions and obligations to employers (Fudge 
and MacPhail 2009). Numbers remained small, at less than 40,000 into the early 
1980s, when they slowly climbed into the 70,000 range (CIC 2009). By the 1990s, 
the TFWP had evolved into a program primarily for high-skill occupations, with 
two additional streams specifically for agricultural workers (Seasonal 
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Agricultural Workers Program - SAWP) and live-in caregivers (Live-in Caregiver 
Program - LICP). During this period the number of TFWs in Canada remained 
fairly steady at around 70,000 (CIC 2009), with highly skilled workers making up 
about two-thirds.1  
The SAWP and the LICP have received significant attention from researchers, 
in part due to the vulnerability of the migrant workers hired under them (e.g., 
Bakan and Stasiulis 1997; Preibisch 2010). In particular the SAWP has been 
subject of much debate, regarded by policy makers as a model program for 
creating a permanent flow of temporary workers for employers (Preibisch 2007), 
but criticized by others for the perpetuation of dangerous and exploitative 
working conditions (Bauder 2006; UFCW 2011). The remaining streams of the 
TFWP have been relatively unexplored until recently, and are the focus of this 
paper. 
The TFWP is jointly administered by Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
(CIC) and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC). HRSDC 
is mandated to process employer applications. Under the rules of the program, 
an employer must demonstrate that recruitment efforts among permanent 
residents were unsuccessful. If HRSDC concurs, they issue a Labour Market 
Opinion (LMO), which permits the employer to recruit temporary foreign 
workers. Until recently, any employment offered TFWs had to be full-time and at 
no less than “market wage” levels identified by HRSDC. Changes announced in 
April 2012 permit an employer to pay a TFW 15 percent less than the posted 
“market wage” (HRSDC 2012). Once a potential employee is offered 
employment, the worker must apply to CIC for a temporary work permit. CIC 
determines if the worker is eligible to enter Canada and whether they are a risk 
of remaining in the country upon expiry of their permit. Work permits granted 
under the TFWP are for a specified period, usually one or two years, and specify 
both the employer and location of work, restricting the worker’s freedom of 
movement. Most TFWs are barred from applying for permanent residency 
through regular immigration streams, although they can be eligible for 
Provincial Nominee Programs. 
TFWs are protected by basic employment protections in their jurisdiction. 
However, significant barriers exist for foreign workers who attempt to utilize 
such protections, rendering them “inaccessible” in any practical way (Nakache 
and Kinoshita 2010), in large part due to restricted labour mobility rights (Wong 
1984; Martin 2003; Abella 2006). Foreign workers under the TFWP are not 
allowed to access settlement services available to permanent immigrants, which, 
combined with language and cultural barriers, lead to a high degree of social 
isolation and estrangement from the community and greater dependency on 
employer-provided orientation, information and services (Pastor and Alva 2004; 
Foster 2008). 
In 2002, in response to pressure from employers for greater access to lower-
skilled workers, the Liberal government established the Low Skill Pilot Project, 
which permitted employers to access foreign workers in lower-skill occupations. 
The Project defined “low skill” as occupations classified as NOC “C”, which 
 require no more than high school education or two years of job
and NOC “D”, requiring no prior training or education. The pilot project greatly 
expanded the number of industries and occupations eligible to access the TFWP.
In 2006, the newly-elected Conservative government implemented further 
changes to the TFWP designed to speed up processing time and extend the pilot 
project. They also introduced a list of “Regional Occupations Under Pressure”, 
applicable to Alberta and 
applications by reducing Canadian
list for each province contained more than 200 occupations, ranging from nurses 
and managers to hotel clerks, food and beverage servers and gas 
attendants. 
The combined effect of the two changes was to increase the total number of 
workers in Canada under the TFWP, and to shift the skill and education level, 
country of origin and demographic distribution of the workers. As the program 
expanded, concerns about exploitation and violation of rights arose (for example 
see AFL 2007; 2009). This will be explored more fully below. 
 
TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS IN CANADA
 
The 2002 pilot program started an increase in the number of TFWs in Canada. 
The 2006 changes accelerated this trend, as Charts 1 and 2 demonstrate. In a 
decade the number of TFWs resident in Canada (referred to officially by the 
federal government as the “stock”
entries jumped from 116,000 t
levelled off, but did not drop significantly, a point to which we will return in the 
discussion below. Preliminary figures released for 2011 show that the number of 
TFWs in Canada began to climb again, surpassi
number of new entries also jumped.
Source: CIC 2009; CIC 2011; CIC 2012
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Source: CIC 2009; CIC 2011; CIC 2012
 
All provinces witnessed an increase in both new entries and the number of 
resident TFWs. The growth was not equal across provinces (Chart 3). Four 
provinces accounted for the bulk of TFWs in Canada: Quebec, Ontario, 
Columbia and Alberta. The latter
with increases of 610 percent
the economic boom in both provinces during the early and mid
and Ontario also saw significant increases. Other pr
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, did see significant percentage increases, although 
the actual number of TFWs remained relatively small. The bulk of TFWs resided 
in larger cities across Canada, with Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary and
Edmonton (in descending order) hosting the largest numbers.
 
  Source: CIC 2009; CIC 2011; CIC 2012
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 skill amongst TFWs. Whereas in 2000
comprised a majority of resident TFWs (51.8
occupations (NOC C, D) had become the largest category. In 2010, 31.1
TFWs were high-skilled, compared to 32.7
It should also be noted that, during the same period,
“occupation not stated” TFWs grew from 17.6
sizeable cluster of unknowns. This uncertainty complicates efforts to determine 
the extent of the shift toward lower
be due to three factors: administrative error, growth in work permits issued to 
spouses (which have fewer restrictions), and unrestricted work permits issued 
under sub-streams of the TFWP such as to U.S. citizens (AFL 2009). Caution must 
be taken with any attempt to project the skill
however. The rise in “not stated” parallels the growth in lower
occupations and the arrival of workers from countries of the global south, 
suggesting a greater portion of the unstated 
lower-skill occupations. Overall, there is a clear pattern of increased use of lower
skilled workers in the TFWP.
A second source of data supports evidence of a shift toward lower
workers. HRSDC released data relat
data is not comparable to CIC data as LMOs are issued to employers and are not 
directly associated with the number of workers who arrive in Canada. However, 
the patterns in the pre-recession period parallel CIC data
LMOs issued tripled between 2005 and 2008, from 74,719 to 175,737. The number 
of LMOs issued for NOC C and NOC D occupations skyrocketed in the 2005
2008 period, while the higher occupation NOC 0 and NOC A remained stable 
(Chart 4). Alberta and 
LMOs, again mirroring CIC figures. With the onset of the recession, the number 
of new LMOs in 2009 dropped temporarily, but began to climb once again in 
2010.  The complexities of this find
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Comparing the top occupational groupings for which LMOs were granted, in 
2005 the top five non-live-in caregiver occupations3 were: musicians and singers; 
actors and comedians; producers, directors and related occupations; specialist 
physicians; other technical occupations in motion pictures and broadcasting. By 
2008 the top five had shifted: Food counter attendants and kitchen helpers; 
cooks; construction trades helpers and labourers; light duty cleaners; musicians 
and singers. Food and beverage servers were number six. The transformation of 
the list is marked. Three of the top five occupational groupings are classified as 
NOC C and D occupations, and only one remains from the 2005 top list (HRSDC 
2010). 
Occupational shift drove a change in gender and country of origin as well. 
Whereas men made up 68.4 percent of TFWs before the expansion, in 2009 the 
split was 57 percent male, 43 percent female. Men continued to make up the 
largest portion of new entries (76 percent of new entries in 2000 compared to 66 
percent in 2009). The discrepancy between the two data sets—total residents vs. 
new entries—suggests that males continue to make up the largest churn of the 
TFWP. Women are staying longer than men in part due to occupational 
differences. Males are over-represented in the building trades occupations, which 
due to occupational requirements may have shorter stays and a higher rate of 
pre-contract expiry exit,4 which might explain much of the discrepancy. 
Before expansion, the TFWP was predominantly a program of the global 
north, as 57.6 percent of the TFWs originated in highly developed nations. The 
top five source countries in 2000 were the United States, Mexico, Japan, United 
Kingdom and Philippines. The situation had reversed by 2009, when less-
developed nations made up 53.7 percent of the TFW’s origins. While the top five 
remained relatively stable—Philippines, United States, Mexico, Australia, United 
Kingdom—overall proportions shifted. Philippines took over top spot in 2007 
and by 2009 made up 18.6 percent of all TFWs in Canada. Just four nations—
Philippines, India, China and Mexico—made up 34.3 percent of TFWs in 2009, up 
from 21.8 percent in 2000. In contrast, the four top developed nations (United 
States, Australia, United Kingdom, Japan), which in 2000 made up 43.5 percent 
of TFWs, had declined to 26.2 percent in 2009. 
 
TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 
 
In the third quarter of 2008, Canada entered a recession. Unemployment 
began to rise during the last two months of 2008 and through 2009, only 
beginning to drop again in mid-2010. From 2008 to 2009, unemployment climbed 
by 36 percent, or 400,000 people. The provinces with the biggest booms—British 
Columbia and Alberta—witnessed the largest climb in unemployment rates. 
While the recession was relatively short-lived in Canada, its initial impact was 
quite deep, with employment dropping at a faster rate than in any post-war 
recession (Cross 2011).  
Predictions were that the number of TFWs would drop as the economy 
slowed, as employers laid off workers generally and the pool of available 
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permanent resident workers increased. It would be expected then that the 
number of new entries would drop off significantly and that the number of TFWs 
in Canada would also be reduced. 
In 2009 and 2010, the TFWP can best be described as leveling off. In both 
years, new entries numbered around 180,000 workers—slightly lower than in 
2008 but higher than any other year since the program’s inception. New entries 
did drop between 2008 and 2009 by 9.3 percent, but rebounded in 2010 by 2.2 
percent. In 2011 the program resumed its upward tracking.  
The total number of TFWs in Canada also stabilized at around 280,000, the 
highest numbers ever. In both years since the downturn, the TFWs residing in 
Canada have increased, by 12.8 percent in 2009 and 0.3 percent in 2010. It should 
be acknowledged the continued growth, especially in the first year of the 
recession, is due in part to a lag effect. TFWs with valid permits are allowed to 
remain in Canada, even if they have no work. However, work permits are for 
one or two years, and so by 2010 unemployed TFWs would have seen their 
permit expire without hope of renewal, which requires current employment or a 
valid job offer. Thus we can conclude that the bulk of the 280,000 TFWs in 
Canada were actively working in December 2010. 
Post-crash, the occupational data related to TFWs was mixed. In the two 
years following the recession’s onset, new entries of TFWs changed rather 
noticeably, particularly in 2010. New entries of higher-skilled occupations 
witnessed a moderate drop of 16 percent over two years, while lower-skilled 
occupations dropped by 50 percent. However, it should also be noted that, as 
observed earlier, the number of “occupation not stated” climbed over 21 percent 
in the same two years, confounding an easy analysis of the trend. However, the 
number of TFWs present in Canada from each skill category remained steady, 
with only a 4 percent drop in higher skilled and a 5 percent drop in lower skilled 
(plus a doubling of the number of “not stated”). 
Chart 5 maps out the relationship between the TFWP and unemployment in 
Canada since 2000. The chart shows the percent change in the total TFWs, new 
entries and the employment rate, with 2000 as the base year and subsequent 
years as a percentage of the 2000 figure. Starting in 2003, both new entries and 
total TFWs climb as unemployment drops, although at a rate exceeding the 
relative tightening of the labour market. As unemployment climbs in 2008 and 
2009, the TFW numbers stabilize, but do not shrink substantially. A program 
sensitive to rises in unemployment would be expected to contract more than the 
existing pattern demonstrates. Provincially, a similar pattern emerges. 
Examining the four provinces with the most TFWs (Charts 6-9), there are no 
significant reductions in the use of TFWs, and in Ontario and Quebec TFW 
numbers continue to increase. 
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Rate of Change, Unemployment and TFWs
  Source: Statistics Canada 2010; CIC 2011
 
Alberta Unemployment and TFWs
  Source: Statistics Canada 2010; CIC 2011
 
B.C. Unemployment and TFWs
  Source: Statistics Canada 2010; CIC 2011
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 Ontario Unemployment and TFWs
  Source: Statistics Canada 2010; CIC 2011
 
Quebec Unemployment and TFWs
  Source: Statistics Canada 2010; CIC 2011
 
HRSDC LMO data tells a slightly more nuanced story. Chart 10 shows the 
total number of LMOs issued between 2005 and 2010. As mentioned above, 
LMOs tripled in the four years before the recession. However LMOs awarded 
dropped 41 percent in 2009, suggesting a sizea
However, in 2009 103,000 new LMOs were issued, at the height of the 
contraction, which is more than any year previous to 2006, and still almost 40
percent higher than at the beginning of the boom period. In addition, in 2010 
showed a quick rebound in LMOs, up 9.4
last half of the year. While granting of new LMOs was somewhat responsive to 
the economic downturn, it did not contract fully back to pre
suggesting some element of the 
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
2006 2007
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
0
50
100
150
200
2006 2007
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Chart 8 
 (2006=100) 
 
Chart 9 
 (2006=100) 
 
ble reaction to the downturn. 
 percent, much of that coming in the 
-boom levels, 
TFWP was responding to other demands.
2008 2009 2010
TFWs
Unemployment
2008 2009 2010
TFWs
Unemployment
Foster   32 
 
 
 
 
33   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society
 
  Source: HRSDC 2011 
 
OCCUPATIONAL DOWNSHIFTING AND SECTORAL RELIANCE
  
One additional trend is important for understanding the changing nature of 
the TFWP. It was reported above that the growth of the TFWP was associated 
with an expansion of lower
demographic make-up of worker
Additional nuances can be drawn from a more detailed analysis of the 
occupational and sectoral locations of foreign workers. This section examines 
what jobs and in what sectors TFWs are working and how that has changed
the past few years. 
Attempts to look more closely at the specific jobs and employers where TFWs 
are found are stymied somewhat by a lack of data related to specific jobs filled by 
TFWs. CIC does not keep statistics on industry, sector or specific 
HRSDC collects more specific information regarding approved LMOs, discussed 
below. There has not been, to the author’s knowledge, any comprehensive 
survey of TFW employment patterns since the rapid expansion of the program.
An analysis by Statistics Canada, from 2006 census data, offers a benchmark 
for TFW employment. It showed that at the time, except for farm workers and 
live-in caregivers (excluded from this analysis), TFWs tended to fill “skilled 
occupations which typically require a great d
2010, 41), including university instructors, computer programmers and scientists. 
Travelling performers also make up a large portion of the jobs filled. Naturally 
the most common sectors employing TFWs were information and c
industries, arts and entertainment and manufacturing. Given the timing of the 
study’s data at the cusp of the influx of lower
more reflective of the program’s initial mandate, rather than current patterns. 
A sectoral analysis of approved LMOs from the period 2005
2011) reveals the TFWP’s shifting mandate. Many traditional TFWP sectors, such 
as education, health care, professional and scientific, either remained flat or saw 
only minor increases in their 
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 entertainment and information and cultural sectors saw a decrease in the number 
of LMOs issued through the period.
Conversely, emerging sectors included retail trade, construction, 
transportation and warehous
accommodation and food service. Each sector saw noted increases in the number 
of LMOs issued to employers. Looking across all sectors, a general pattern 
emerges of a downshifting in occupational make
data presented earlier. Further, it should be noted that this shift is a consequence 
of the influx of lower-skilled TFWs, rather than any significant reduction in the 
use of high-skilled TFWs.
While a number of sectors saw moderate growth in their 
four stand out. Exponential growth in LMOs occurred in construction, 
manufacturing, retail trade, and accommodation and food services, as shown in 
Chart 11. Between 2005 and 2008 these four sectors saw increases of between 200
percent and almost 900
accommodation and food services.
LMOs in 2009, between 41
the more traditional TFWP industries. However
accommodation/food quickly rebounded with increases above 30
both cases, in 2010 the number of LMOs issued was more than five times the 
number issued in 2005. 
 
  Source: HRSDC 2011 
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nuance in the analysis of the shift in the TFWP. Demand for TFWs was more 
elastic in some sectors than others. This will be discussed more fully below. 
Before the 2002 and 2006 policy changes, TFWs were found working as 
university teachers, scientists, specialist technicians and entertainers. TFWs that 
arrived between 2005 and 2008 were more likely to be coming to work as cooks, 
clerks, cleaning staff, construction labourers and truck drivers. Some of those 
jobs dried up post-2008, but many employers continued, or quickly returned, to 
rely on TFWs for labour needs in the post-crash period. Employers most likely to 
do that were in the retail, accommodation and food service sectors, a marked 
change from a decade earlier. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
What do the pre- and post-crash patterns in TFW employment tell us about 
the current state of the TFWP and its possible future directions? It is clear that 
during the past decade the TFWP expanded rapidly and the expansion is due 
mostly to the influx of lower-skilled workers as a result of government policy 
changes to the mandate of the program. But did the purpose of the program— to 
address temporary labour shortages in specific industries and occupations—also 
change?  
The data presented above suggest that as the downturn struck, some 
restriction in the inflow of TFWs occurred, particularly among lower skilled 
workers, but not at a sufficient level to contract the overall size of the program. 
The 2008 economic downturn had the effect of pausing the rapid expansion of 
the TFWP, but by the latter part of 2010 and 2011 the program was beginning to 
grow once again. 
We see that in 2009 the number of new LMOs fell dramatically and total new 
entries leveled off, particularly in the sectors that witnessed the largest growth in 
the 2005-2008 period. However, the total number of TFWs resident in Canada did 
not drop. This apparent contradiction requires some explanation. The different 
trends are the result of each statistic measuring a different aspect of the 
phenomenon. LMOs track the future demand for new TFWs, and are best seen as 
a measure of the program’s rate of growth. Total residency looks at the number 
of TFWs currently residing in Canada, and thus is a measure of current demand 
in the labour market. 
A plausible scenario arising out of this mixed pattern is thus: at the onset of 
the recession, employers throttled back their search for new TFWs, but the 
demand for existing TFWs remained. It should be highlighted that employer 
demand for new TFWs did not dry up completely—had demand completely 
disappeared, LMOs issued would have been zero. Even at the height of the 
recession, many employers were applying for the right to hire new TFWs (or 
renew a contract for existing TFWs). In addition, the failure to see a drop in total 
TFWs suggests that the bulk of TFWs remained in Canada and were most likely 
employed. The level of demand for TFWs was steady during a period when 
policy-makers predicted it would contract. 
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It could be argued that the restriction of new entries demonstrates some 
degree of elasticity in the TFWP. However, it is difficult to reconcile that view 
with the fact that, when the program briefly paused in 2009, it was at a level 
three times larger than before the wave of expansion. Plus, in 2010 it showed 
signs of recommencing its growth; a trend confirmed in 2011. The TFWP did not 
shrink, as expected, during a significant economic downturn, raising questions 
about how elastic the program is. While further research is required, the 
preliminary analysis presented here suggests the TFWP has become a more 
significant, and more permanent, feature in Canada’s labour market, partially 
disconnected from domestic labour market fluctuations. 
Of course, as noted earlier, the TFWP and the use of temporary foreign 
labour more generally in Canada is not new. Both the SAWP and the LICP have 
for many decades been entrenched parts of their respective sectors (agriculture 
and domestic services), and the TFWP has long served specific industries, such 
as entertainment and post-secondary education. Demand for TFWs in these 
sectors remained steady through the period, and were unaffected by the 
economic swings. This is not surprising, given the international character of their 
labour markets and their longstanding employment patterns. 
What is new in the evidence presented above is the emergence of a cluster of 
new industries and sectors using TFWs more regularly and possibly becoming 
reliant upon a flow of TFWs to address longer term labour market needs. These 
are sectors that, until recently, drew exclusively from permanent Canadian 
residents for labour. 
Specifically, retail trade, accommodation and food services and 
transportation and warehousing significantly increased their use of TFWs. 
Further, in those new sectors, demand for new LMOs rebounded much more 
quickly than in other sectors, and faster than the economy as a whole. Much of 
the expansion of the TFWP is attributable to employment in these sectors, most 
of which is lower-skilled employment. Translating that to jobs, the period under 
examination saw a greater reliance on TFWs to be cooks, clerks, cleaners, truck 
drivers and warehouse labourers. The speed with which requests for new LMOs 
rebounded following the downturn hints at a growing reliance by employers in 
these sectors on TFWs as a source of labour. 
The special case of the construction and manufacturing sectors requires some 
comment. Demand for TFWs spiked significantly in both industries during the 
economic boom, but fell back dramatically after the crash. Demand for new 
TFWs did not rebound in 2010 as it did in the sectors discussed above. On the 
surface this may appear to be an example of how policy-makers claim the 
program operates. TFWs fill a need for short-term labour in times of shortage, 
but then employers turn to domestically available workers during more lean 
times.  
However it may also be a characteristic of these two industries. Both 
construction and manufacturing are more susceptible to boom and bust cycles, 
and their employment patterns reflect more starkly those cycles (Tinbergen and 
Polak 2005) with deeper troughs and sharper peaks. An important question for 
37   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 19—Autumn 2012    
 
the coming period of economic growth is how quickly and how extensively will 
employers in these sectors turn to TFWs to address labour issues? Foster and 
Taylor (2011) report from interviews with construction employers in Alberta’s oil 
sands that TFWs are becoming a preferred source of labour for the sector and 
that companies are making plans for a new influx of TFWs in 2012 and 2013 as oil 
sands construction is projected to heat up again. It is too soon to reach a firm 
conclusion regarding the reliance on TFWs in these two sectors, however, and 
further research is required. 
The analysis presented here suggests that an increasing number of sectors are 
turning to TFWs to address core labour supply issues and not simply to act as a 
relief valve during times of shortage. Indeed, the labour market patterns found in 
agriculture and domestic services may now be replicated in restaurants, hotels, 
and retail stores. The consequences of this shift will be discussed below. 
The evolution of the TFWP over the past decade parallels the experience with 
Europe’s guest worker programs, where sectors at the bottom end of the labour 
market become increasingly reliant upon migrant workers for labour supply, 
creating so-called migrant worker ghettos (Martin 2003). Prior to 2002, Canada 
avoided this outcome by restricting the TFWP to higher-skill occupations, 
keeping overall numbers down. The changes of 2002 and 2006 altered this policy 
and have set the program on a new trajectory. By opening up the program to a 
tier of occupations normally reserved for permanent residents, the government 
created a new international pool of labour for employers in hotels, restaurants, 
retail stores and other lower-skill occupations. Importing TFWs is attractive to 
employers in these sectors because the workers are compliant, more willing to 
work for low wages and less mobile than permanent residents (due to their 
restrictive work permits). The desirability of a docile labour pool has the 
potential to produce a reliance on foreign workers. 
 
RHETORIC VS. REALITY 
 
The data presented above run counter to the public statements of key 
government officials regarding the program’s purpose and function. During the 
TFWP’s expansion phase in the mid-2000s, policy makers argued the program 
was helping employers counteract short-term labour shortages. Even during the 
depths of the downturn, the Minister of Immigration, Jason Kenney, publicly 
asserted nothing had changed in the program’s purpose: 
 
The [TFWP] aims to address labour shortages that are temporary, where neither 
Canadians nor permanent residents can be found to meet these needs. Generally 
speaking, the number of foreign workers that come to Canada depends on employer 
demand. Therefore, increased numbers of temporary foreign workers should not be 
interpreted as a shift in the Government of Canada’s policy toward temporary 
migration (Kenney 2010: 10).  
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Further, the Minister argued that TFWs were expected to leave the country if 
they lost their job, and predicted that “the full effects of the recession and its 
consequences for the labour market will translate into decreased numbers of 
temporary foreign workers” (13). Policy makers assured Canadians that formal 
procedures embedded into the TFWP, such as the requirement of a valid LMO 
based upon market need, expiry dates for work permits and rigidity in wage 
setting provided a mechanism to contract the program during downturns. It is 
upon this basis they claim the program is for short term labour needs. 
Most mainstream analyses of the TFWP also adopt the position that it is a 
temporary labour market adjustment program. For example, one economic 
analysis concludes “[t]emporary foreign worker programs are designed to 
alleviate short-term specific labor shortages and are not expected to have long-
term adverse effects on internal labor markets” (Gross and Schmitt 2010, 21). 
Even studies critical of the TFWP’s lack of protections for TFWs assume the 
program is designed for short-term labour market needs (for example see 
Siemiatycki 2010). 
The evidence presented above belies expectations and the explicit assurances 
of government officials. Rather than contracting, the TFWP is staged to continue 
its expansion in the coming years. One reason for the contradiction between 
rhetoric and reality may be that the program is primarily employer-driven, and 
as such government has no direct capacity to reduce applications for new TFWs. 
If employers are forming dependence on TFWs, the TFWP lacks the tools to 
check rising demand.  
There is also evidence that employers and recruiters have developed fairly 
sophisticated techniques to satisfy HRSDC’s job search requirements (see AFL 
2009). One recruiter interviewed by the author acknowledged that the domestic 
recruitment process is perceived as a formality. This recruiter indicates they 
usually have a TFW recruited before posting the position domestically, and the 
recruiter assists the employer with placing ads to facilitate the LMO process. The 
recruiter reported the recession had no effect on the demand for LMOs. “Every 
one of our clients up there, they’ve been hiring throughout everything, that 
hasn’t changed. It’s still, we need guys, find us some guys” (personal 
communication, October 2010). 
Recent changes announced to the TFWP are aimed at addressing some of the 
shortcomings in protection of TFW rights, but also mark an acknowledgement of 
its continued importance in the future. In 2008, Citizenship and Immigration 
announced the Canadian Experience Class stream, which allows high-skilled 
TFWs (NOC 0, A and B) with two years’ work experience in Canada to apply for 
permanent residency. In 2011, new regulations governing the TFWP were 
implemented, with two primary effects. First, TFWs are now limited to a 
maximum of four years residency in Canada, after which they would be 
ineligible for another work permit for a period of four years.5 Second, enhanced 
procedures were implemented to confirm the genuineness of a job offer, and a 
two-year ban was issued on LMOs for any employer who breaches their legal 
obligations through the TFWP. 
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A CIC official indicates the purpose of the new regulations was to update the 
TFWP for new realities. “The regulations were from the 1970s and they didn’t 
foresee how it was going to unfold in modern times with the explosion [of 
TFWs]” (personal communication, April 2011). The new regulations in effect 
recognize the new permanent role the TFWP plays in the labour market, 
especially among lower-skilled workers. The same official speculated that the 
program would continue to grow in the future: “employers use whatever works 
for them. […] If an employer can successfully get a LMO they are going to get 
work permits” (personal communication, April 2011).   
For the past decade, researchers specializing in immigration issues have 
observed the trend in Canadian immigration policy away from permanent 
residency to temporary migration (see Sharma 2007), and interpret the TFWP as 
part of that overall policy shift. This is a useful context in which to understand 
the growth of the TFWP, in particular because its new emphasis suggests 
“primary decision making around access to permanent residency [has been] 
transferred by the Canadian state to Canadian employers” (Valiani 2010, 1). 
However, the lens of immigration produces an incomplete analysis of TFWs as it 
does not examine labour market forces and their effect on policy design. The 
expansion of TFWP is driven by employer demand to address concerns related to 
the cost of labour; an analytical component often missed in the immigration 
debate. These decisions have direct effect on the operation of the labour market 
over the long term. It is to those potential consequences that we now turn. 
 
LABOUR MARKET CONSEQUENCES 
 
There has been very little research into the Canadian labour market effects of 
a sizeable, long-term migrant worker program reaching into multiple industry 
sectors. What research that has been done examined the labour market outcomes 
for TFWs themselves, which shows TFWs fare better than landed immigrants 
because they more aptly fit employer needs (Warman 2009). Other economic 
analyses from a neo-classical perspective concludes that the TFWP distorts 
regional labour market patterns by suppressing inter-regional labour mobility 
from provinces of higher unemployment to areas of low unemployment (Gross 
and Schmitt 2010; Gross 2010). There has been very little investigation into how 
the TFWP alters labour market dynamics such as domestic labour demand, 
wages and employment regulation. The discussion below is intended as a 
conjectural starting point for further research. 
One of the clearer consequences of increased reliance upon TFWs is an 
increase in the number of workers vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous 
employers. TFWs are formally covered by all employment regulations, but 
enforcement of those protections proves problematic. Federally, little follow up is 
conducted to police employer obligations to workers (Fudge and MacPhail 2009). 
Provincial labour standards enforcement is complaint-driven and, other than 
Alberta which targets employers with LMOs, no special measures have been 
implemented to address protection of vulnerable foreign workers. TFWs, 
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hindered by their restrictive work permits, do not have the range of options 
available to other workers (e.g., to change employers), and thus become more 
susceptible to employment rights violations. In Alberta, during a targeted 
inspection campaign, 74 percent of employers with TFWs were found to have 
breached employment standards, with the most frequent violations involving 
illegal deductions, unpaid statutory holiday pay and inadequate record keeping 
(AEI 2010). The financial advantage afforded employers choosing to subvert 
employment regulation through the use of TFWs can become quite significant. 
One of the great ironies of the program’s structure is that, while the TFWP is 
becoming more permanent and persistent, the individual TFWs remain 
steadfastly temporary. Each year, tens of thousands of TFWs leave the country as 
their work permits expire, only to be replaced by tens of thousands of new 
TFWs, many to work for the same employer. The longer a TFW remains in 
Canada, the more likely they are to learn of their employment rights and find 
ways to advocate for those rights. By entrenching a short-term employment 
period, employers forestall any “rights learning” that may occur. The new four-
year cap on residence will only exacerbate this dynamic. 
Those looking for signs of what a TFW-dominated employment sector may 
look like can look at Canada’s experience with the Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Program (SAWP), which has a long history of using low-skilled migrant workers 
to work on farms, particularly in Ontario and British Columbia. It points to an 
industry that has become highly dependent upon foreign workers and 
increasingly separated from domestic labour markets (Fudge and MacPhail 
2009). The agricultural sector has arisen as a low-wage labour market segment, 
where employers rely more upon Mexican workers than resident workers. This 
has suppressed wages, weakened health and safety protections and permitted 
the workforce to become marginalized both in the labour market and the 
communities in which they live (UFCW 2011). The influx of low-skilled workers 
risks replicating the SAWP program in other sectors, such as fast food and 
hospitality. 
A second replication of the SAWP/LICP experiences may be a rise in TFW 
self-advocacy. Despite the challenges they face, migrant workers have taken 
action collectively to defend their legal and human rights. Live-in caregivers 
have mobilized to improve their legal standing in Canada (Sharma 2001) and 
farm workers have turned to joining unions and other collective action in 
response to poor working conditions (Dugale 2009). Many migrant workers have 
reached out to broader community advocacy groups to develop justice 
campaigns in many Canadian cities (Cranford and Ladd 2003). The last couple of 
years have witnessed the beginnings of similar collective action on the part of 
TFWs, who have organized rallies (Keung 2009) and joined unions (Foster and 
Barnetson,2012) to defend their rights. It can be anticipated that TFWs will 
engage in more struggle as employers attempt to entrench working conditions. 
Turning to wages, theoretically the TFWP, unlike the SAWP, was, until recent 
changes, structured to prevent wage suppression through the requirement of 
paying a market rate determined by HRSDC. However there has been significant 
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criticism of the methodology utilized by HRSDC suggesting the market level is 
somewhat arbitrary (Flecker 2010). As for wage suppression, some evidence 
reported by Fudge and MacPhail (2009) indicates that, during the boom, wage 
increases for occupations on the Under Pressure list were no higher than other 
occupations, suggesting “that the low-skilled streams of the TFWP operate as a 
device to regulate the Canadian labour market by lowering wages and 
conditions of employment” (26). This runs contrary to conventional labour 
market thinking, which would predict that occupations experiencing labour 
shortages would experience higher than average wage increases. While the 
evidence is indirect, it is consistent with effects of migrant worker programs 
elsewhere (Ruhs and Martin 2008). If used as a short-term labour shortage fix, the 
TFWP may reduce the rate of wage inflation, as the above suggests. If the 
program has become permanent, then wage suppression effects may also become 
entrenched, affecting the structural balance of the labour market over the long 
term. This concern is amplified with the recent changes permitting TFWs to be 
paid up to 15 percent less than the “market rate”. The new policy 
institutionalizes a differential rate for TFWs and legitimizes currently illegal 
practices of paying TFWs less than permanent residents, suggesting that wage 
suppression may become a serious concern going forward.6 
Further evidence of perverse implications can be found by examining the 
outcomes of other vulnerable and marginal groups who cluster at the lower end 
of the labour market. Labour market outcomes have worsened for new 
immigrants in the past decade, including lower incomes and lower employment 
rates (Sweetman and Warman 2010). In addition, unemployment rates for 
aboriginal workers climbed during the mid-2000s boom (Voyageur 2007). These 
groups are finding themselves in direct competition with TFWs for access to 
entry-level and low-skilled jobs. Employers may see the new pool of TFWs as a 
more desirable and affordable option compared to these groups, and thus TFWS 
supplant their position in the market. This may be particularly relevant for 
immigrants, who possess similar labour market challenges (i.e., language 
barriers, lack of familiarity with community) but have not been “hand-picked” 
by the employer. 
Unionization may also be affected. TFWs, with their short-term employment 
duration and enhanced dependence upon the employer, are more difficult to 
organize or to engage in collective action. Many longer-term benefits of 
unionization escape individual TFWs, as their employment is of such short 
duration. Plus it needs to be highlighted that the growth in TFW usage is 
predominantly in industries with low union density and where unions have 
traditionally struggled to organize. The presence of TFWs makes that task no 
easier. In this respect the TFWP assists employers in making themselves more 
union-proof. 
The TFWP’s most important effect may be how it contributes to the push by 
employers and neo-liberal governments toward a more flexible labour market. 
Competitive pressures and global competition have driven employers to contain 
labour costs through a variety of avenues, including regulatory liberalization, 
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anti-union animus and economic pressure (see Stanford and Vosko 2004). The 
TFWP may be best seen as another avenue by which employers pursue a more 
flexible, compliant workforce. Not only do TFWs expand the available labour 
pool, thus diluting worker bargaining power, they introduce a form of 
employment relationship that places greater legal and economic power in the 
hands of the employer. The effects of this new relationship can be exerted 
directly on the TFWs themselves, as well as used to leverage broader labour 
market outcomes favourable to employers (i.e., dampening wage growth). The 
latter point is important. The presence of TFWs may also serve to chasten the 
domestic labour force in its demands, not only during economic booms but more 
generally. 
The chastening is aided and abetted by the state, which plays a key role in 
establishing employer-friendly labour market dynamics through the TFWP. By 
restricting the labour mobility rights of TFWs and by relying heavily on the 
contract of employment to regulate the employment relationship, the state 
facilitates a skewing of bargaining power in key sectors of the labour market. 
TFWs represent the epitome of the “flexible” worker, in large part due to policy 
decisions on the part of the state. 
The rapid expansion and entrenchment of the TFWP remains a recent 
phenomenon and its effects are only just beginning to be felt. Early signs suggest 
it works to edge the balance of bargaining power toward employers. Much more 
work is needed to extract its impact on the Canadian labour market in the 
medium and long term.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With the decision to expand the TFWP to low-skilled occupations, the 
Canadian government set into motion a transformation of Canada’s foreign 
worker regime. The obvious consequence was the rapid expansion of the 
program during the economic boom of the mid-2000s into sectors. More 
significant, however, was the quiet entrenchment of the program into Canada’s 
labour market. The program opened up a new avenue of available workers for 
employers in industries traditionally restricted to a domestic labour pool, such as 
retail and restaurants. This has led to a separation of the TFWP from its original 
purposes as a mechanism for addressing labour shortage issues in select 
occupations and industries. It now has the broader function of regulating labour 
supply in a fashion optimal for employer bargaining power.  
Furthermore, this shift occurred without formal announcement or debate. 
Government officials continue to speak the language of the original mandate of 
the program, despite evidence to the contrary. There may be a political 
pragmatism in the unwillingness to admit the new direction of the program. 
While neo-liberal governments are quite frank about their willingness to advance 
employer interests, politicians may be fearful of conservative voters raising 
concerns about an influx of foreign workers “stealing” jobs from “Canadians”. 
By keeping the new nature of the TFWP under the radar, governments may be 
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hoping to avoid political backlash. Regardless, the stealth nature of the 
transformation should raise concerns for Canadians and for observers of the 
Canadian labour market.  
The newly bulked-up TFWP is here to stay. We begin to see glimpses of how 
it will alter labour market dynamics in Canada. However, the long-term effects 
remain unknown. 
 
NOTES 
                                                           
1  For a certain percentage of files, CIC is unable to determine the occupational level for 
a worker. The proportion of “unstated” occupational categories ranges from 15% to 
30% in a given year. The “unstated” were excluded for the above calculation. 
2  TFW “stock” is seen by many to be a de-humanizing term when discussing the 
number of foreign workers residing in Canada. As such, this article will minimize its 
use, but makes reference to it for clarity. A fuller discussion of the appropriateness of 
the term is outside the scope of this article. 
3  The largest occupational grouping in all years is nannies and babysitters, as LMOs 
issued under the Live-In Caregiver Program are included in the tables. For the 
purposes of this analysis, those LMOs have been removed. The number of live-in 
caregivers has remained relatively stable during the period. 
4  In every province except British Columbia, TFWs in building trades occupations are 
given a period of time to pass provincial certification. If they fail, they are required to 
return home before the completion of their contract. 
5  The duration maximum does not apply to workers classified as NOC 0 and NOC A. 
6  Officially, the policy requires the employer to pay TFWs the same rate as permanent 
residents working in the same occupation at the workplace. However, the policy 
wording is loose, and its enforcement lax, leaving opportunity for employers who 
wish to skirt the formal requirements of the policy. 
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